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NOTE
Waste-d Chance: The Risk of Ignoring
Judicial Federalism in Local Controversies
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089 (8th Cir. 2021).
Betsy Smith*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Manhattan Project caused death and destruction in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki and sparked a nuclear arms race around the world.1 The
Project’s legacy is most closely associated with Los Alamos, New Mexico,
the site of the primary research laboratory.2 But, the primary research site,
smaller project sites, and disposal sites throughout the country have been
plagued by environmental consequences.3 Its effects are still being felt
today, even in the world of civil procedure.4 One landfill in St. Louis, in
particular, holds significant amounts of nuclear waste from the program
and has recently sparked major class-action litigation.5
Class-action lawsuits, like the litigation involving the Manhattan
Project nuclear waste in St. Louis, are governed by the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).6 CAFA grants federal jurisdiction for
class actions that fit its requirements, such as an amount in controversy in

*B.J. University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2023; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022; Senior Associate
Editor, 2022–2023, Missouri Law Review. I am extremely grateful to Professor
Thomas Bennett for his support, insight, and patience during the writing of this Note,
as well as to Elizabeth Weaver, Mackenzie Stout, and the members of the Missouri
Law Review for their help in the editing process.
1
The
Manhattan
Project,
ATOMIC
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION,
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/manhattan-project [https://perma.cc/G946YST2] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021). The Manhattan Project was the U.S.’s atomic
bomb development project during World War II that used nuclear energy, making
nuclear waste in turn. Id.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2021).
6
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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excess of $5,000,000 and minimal diversity.7 Even where those
requirements are met, however, CAFA has certain exceptions that require
remand back to state court.8 The local controversy exception requires a
federal court to remand a case to state court where the case has a
sufficiently parochial character—i.e., where a local defendant’s conduct
forms a significant basis of the claim.9 This exception, like the larger
statute of which it is a part, is rife with legal ambiguity.10
In Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, the Eighth Circuit settled an
important question about the local controversy exception: what does it
mean for a defendant’s conduct to form a “significant basis” of the
plaintiffs’ claims?11 The Kitchin court adopted an approach that favors
retaining federal jurisdiction for class action lawsuits, even when the
controversies are local and therefore might more appropriately be decided
by a state court.12 It held that a local defendant’s conduct must be
substantively distinct from other defendants’ conduct to satisfy CAFA’s
“significant basis” test.13 To do so, the court relied on statutory
interpretation and legislative purpose justifications and ultimately avoided
answering a question about judicial federalism. Part II of this Note
explains the relevant facts and procedural background of Kitchin. Part III
explores the history of the local controversy exception and its various
applications. Part IV discusses the Eighth Circuit’s decision and rationale.
Finally, Part V analyzes the Kitchin holding and argues that the Eighth
Circuit ultimately failed to consider the substantial implications of
creating more hurdles for class action plaintiffs to litigate their claims in
local state forums.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
John C. Kitchin, Jr., and Mary Menke (“Plaintiffs”) own property in
Bridgeton, Missouri, near the West Lake Landfill.14 Plaintiffs filed a
complaint on behalf of a putative class against Bridgeton Landfill, LLC;
Republic Services, Inc.; Allied Services, LLC; and Rock Road Industries,
7
Id. § 1332(d)(2). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 expanded federal
diversity jurisdiction in class action lawsuits where plaintiffs seek at least $5 million
in damages and where at least one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states.
8
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
9
7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1756.2 (3d ed. 2021).
10
Id. Local controversy exception cases have been litigated over which party
has the burden of proof for proving the local controversy exists, what is the meaning
of its greater than two-thirds of the class members requirement, and more.
11
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2021).
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
Id. at 1091.
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Inc. (“Defendants”), the owners and operators of the landfill.15 Of the
Defendants, only Rock Road Industries was a Missouri citizen when the
complaint was filed.16 The Plaintiffs sought to represent subclasses
comprised of Missouri citizens who owned property or resided within an
eleven square-mile area around the landfill.17
The basis of these suits stems back to the mid-1900s. In the 1940s
and 1950s, a government contractor refined uranium in St. Louis in
connection with the Manhattan Project, which created radioactive waste.18
In 1973, a corporation not involved in this action expelled over 46,000
tons of a soil-and-radioactive-waste mixture in West Lake Landfill.19 The
nuclear waste mixture covered the municipal waste that was dumped in
the landfill.20 The Environmental Protection Agency placed the landfill
on the Superfund National Priorities List for investigation and cleanup in
1990.21 In 2017 and 2018, after learning that their properties were
contaminated with radioactive waste from the landfill, Plaintiffs brought
suit.22
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were responsible for the
contamination of their property due to Defendants’ “improper acceptance
and handling of radioactive waste at the landfill.”23Plaintiffs filed their
complaint in state court.24 Defendants removed the action to federal
court,25 claiming there was federal-question jurisdiction under the PriceAnderson Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),26 as well as diversity
15

Id.
Id. Shortly after Plaintiffs filed the complaint, Defendant Rock Road
Industries merged into Defendant Bridgeton Landfill, LLC. Bridgeton Landfill is the
surviving entity.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. The Price-Anderson Act ensures that there is a large
amount of government funds available for members of the public who are damaged
by nuclear or radiological incidents. The Price-Anderson Act, CENTER FOR NUCLEAR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Nov. 2005), https://cdn.ans.org/policy/
statements/docs/ps54-bi.pdf [https://perma.cc/XKU6-ZZWA]; 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et
seq. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
requires there to be a federal superfund for uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous
waste cleanup. Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-comprehensive16
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jurisdiction under CAFA.27 Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the
Price-Anderson Act and CERCLA did not give federal courts jurisdiction
and CAFA’s local controversy exception applied.28
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
remanded the case to state court, finding that the local controversy
exception to CAFA applied.29 Defendants appealed the court’s decision
to remand and challenged the district court’s application of the local
controversy exception.30
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the local defendant’s conduct did
not form a “significant basis” for Plaintiffs’ claims because the complaint
also leveled essentially identical claims against several out-of-state
defendants.31 And thus, the court held that the local controversy exception
did not apply.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before CAFA, the complete diversity rule required that, in cases
where more than one plaintiff sued more than one defendant, each plaintiff
be diverse from each defendant to sue in federal court.33 This completediversity requirement, in turn, kept most state law class actions in state
court.34
In 2005, Congress enacted CAFA, granting federal courts original
jurisdiction over class actions where: (1) the amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000,000, and (2) there is minimal diversity.35 CAFA is subject
to certain exceptions, including the local controversy exception at issue in
Kitchin.36

environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act
[https://perma.cc/BFU8VFGJ] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
27
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
28
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1092.
29
Id. The district court concluded that federal-question jurisdiction did not exist,
and Defendants did not challenge this decision on appeal. Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1094, 1096; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb).
32
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1094.
33
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 3605 (3d
ed.).
34
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals,
156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (2008).
35
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Minimal diversity exists where at least one plaintiff
is from a different state than at least one defendant. Id.
36
Id.
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Congress enacted CAFA because state courts were “keeping cases of
national importance out of federal court,” and some legislators believed
state courts demonstrated bias against out-of-state defendants and
inappropriately bound residents of other states. 37 One legislative goal of
CAFA was to resolve all doubts in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction
over the case.38 The purpose of increased federal jurisdiction was to create
uniformity in how class action lawsuits would be processed and handled.39
Records also suggest that another reason Congress enacted CAFA was to
streamline class actions and avoid the “straw man” problem.40 The straw
man problem occurs when a plaintiff includes a local defendant in the
complaint merely to avoid federal jurisdiction, on the theory that state
courts are more plaintiff-friendly with class actions.41 However,
arguments over whether federal or state courts should decide major class
action suits implicate competing federal and state interests due to judicial
federalism.42 Although CAFA generally extends jurisdiction of federal
courts over class-action suits, the local controversy exception reflects a
concern for local interests as it requires federal courts to decline
jurisdiction over local disputes.43
The local controversy exception’s roots predate the enactment of
CAFA.44 Before CAFA, if a plaintiff included a local defendant in its

37

7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9.
Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 144 (2006).
39
SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C., Federal or State Class Actions,
https://www.sommerspc.com/videos/understanding-class-action-lawsuits-federal-orstate-class/ [https://perma.cc/4Y69-HX2U] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
40
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594 n.3 (2006); See James Wootten, President of the
U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Testimony Before the ABA Class Action Task
Force 2 (Apr. 8, 2002); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney
Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593 (2006).
41
Sherman, supra note 40, at 1593, n.3; See James Wootten, President of the
U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Testimony Before the ABA Class Action Task
Force 2 (Apr. 8, 2002); Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 593.
42
Willy E. Rice, Allegedly "Biased," "Intimidating," and "Incompetent" State
Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to
Purportedly "Impartial" and "Competent" Federal Courts-A Historical Perspective
and an Essay, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 423–24 (2012). Judicial federalism
describes the federal and state court separation of judicial authority. DONALD P.
HAIDER-MARKEL, JUDICIAL FEDERALISM, POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. STATES
AND REGIONS 819 (Donald P. Haider-Markel, 1st ed. 2009).
43
15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3866.2, (4th ed. 2021); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
44
Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 596.
38
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claim, the case was not removable to federal court.45 Practically, however,
defendants often removed the case to federal court and made the plaintiff
seek remand to state court.46
The local controversy exception requires federal courts to decline
jurisdiction on two occasions—when:
(A)(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed;
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant-(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the
claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was
originally filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in
which the action was originally filed; and
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action,
no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual
allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other
persons; or
(B) two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State
in which the action was originally filed.47

Parties may immediately appeal grants and denials of motions to remand
cases removed under CAFA as a collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.48
45

Id.
Id.
47
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)–(B).
48
14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3724 (4th ed. 2021). The ability to immediately appeal a grant or
remand of removal is an exception from the general rule of appealability. The ability
to immediately appeal a grant or remand of removal is an exception from the general
rule of appealability. YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 672 (Wolters
Kluwer, 10th ed. 2019). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, appeals can generally only be
brought after a final judgment from a district court. Also, remand orders are generally
not reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
46
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Courts review this issue de novo.49 Plaintiff – typically the party seeking
to remand the case to state court – has the burden to prove that an exception
to CAFA, like the local controversy exception, applies and thus that the
case should be remanded.50 As a conjunctive test, the requesting party
must prove that all of the elements of the local controversy exception are
met.51 Courts determine whether or not the local controversy exception
test is satisfied by looking at the claims alleged in the complaint.52 While
it is typically straightforward to show that the two-thirds requirement is
met for the plaintiffs and that a defendant is a citizen of the relevant state,
the success of many local controversy pleadings turn on whether a
defendant’s conduct formed a “significant basis” or where the “principal
injuries” occurred.53

A. “Significant Basis” Under the Local Controversy Exception
The local controversy exception applies if an in-state defendant’s
conduct formed a “significant basis” of the plaintiff’s claims.54 CAFA
does not explicitly define what constitutes a “significant basis,” and there
is currently a split among the circuits.55 Courts apply one of two tests:
(1) the comparative approach, which compares the conduct of the local
defendant to the conduct of the other defendants to determine if it is a
significant basis of the complaint;56 or (2) the Evans approach, which
defines “significant” as more than “lesser or minimal,” and analyzes the
significant basis and the significant relief elements together.57
The Eleventh Circuit follows the Evans approach,58 and the First,
Second, and Fourth Circuits have relied on Evans, though they have not

49

Opelousas v. Gen. Hosp. Auth. V. FairPay Sols., Inc. 655 F.3d 358, 360 (5th
Cir. 2011). Under de novo review, the court substitutes its own judgment for the
judgment of the trial court. State v. Clapp, 761 S.E.2d 710, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
50
14C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 48.
51
Atwood v. Peterson, 936 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2019).
52
Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc. 631 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011).
53
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
54
Id.
55
See Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009)
(comparing the conduct of the local defendant to the conduct of the other defendants
to determine whether the local defendant’s conduct is a significant basis); see Evans
v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019) (determining that significant
means more than a “lesser or minimal role”); see Coleman, 631 F.3d at 1013
(comparing the conduct of the local defendant to the other defendants and considering
equivalent conduct to be significant).
56
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 156.
57
Evans, 449 F.3d at 1167.
58
Id.
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explicitly adopted any approach.59 The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use the comparative approach.60
Although most courts use the comparative approach,61 there is further
divide within the comparative method: some courts apply a substantive
distinction test, while other courts incorporate a same conduct test.62 Trial
courts in the Eighth Circuit previously used both the substantive
distinction approach and the same conduct approach before the Eighth
Circuit explicitly adopted the substantive distinction approach in
Westerfeld v. Independent Processing.63

1. Substantive Distinctive Approach
The substantive distinction approach requires the local defendant’s
conduct to be “important” and “notable” as compared to other
defendants.64 Therefore, the complaint must allege conduct on behalf of
the local defendant that is distinct from that of the other defendants.65
Support for the substantive distinction approach comes from the plain
text of the statute, the ordinary definition of “significant,”66 and a Senate
Report about CAFA.67 For example, in Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey
Inc., the Third Circuit used these familiar tools of statutory interpretation
to determine what constitutes a “significant basis.”68 The court noted that
CAFA’s text was unambiguous, so the “statute must be construed to give
effect, if possible, to every word and clause.”69 Further, the Kaufman court
59
See Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 364 (E.D. La. 2007); see
Mattera v. Clear Channel Comms., Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see Eakins
v. Pella Corp., 455 F.Supp.2d 450 (E.D. N.C. 2006).
60

See Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 144; see Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v.
FairPay Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2011); see Mason v.
Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 396 (6th Cir. 2016); see
Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 584 (7th Cir. 2017);
see Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1096 (8th Cir. 2021); see
Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011); see
Woods v. Standard Ins., 771 F.3d 1257, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2014).
61
Id.
62
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1094.
63
City of O’Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc. 930 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1048–50 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2013); Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2010).
64
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 157.
65
Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 396 (6th Cir.
2016).
66
See Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 157; see Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay
Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2011).
67
See Mason, 842 F.3d at 397.
68
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 155.
69
Id. (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 166–68
(2004)).
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noted that courts should view statutory provisions in the context of the
whole statute.70
The Kaufman court first determined, by looking at the plain text of
CAFA, that the significant basis provision “relates the alleged conduct of
the local defendant. . . to all the claims asserted in the action.”71 Then, the
court noted that there is no quantitative requirement in the statute as to
what conduct forms a significant basis.72 The court concluded that the
appropriate way to construe the significant basis provision was to compare
the local defendant’s alleged conduct to all defendants’ alleged conduct.73
In doing so, the Kaufman court rejected the district court’s analysis of
significant basis as “more than trivial or of no importance.”74 While this
approach adds some clarity to the interpretation of “significant basis,” it
still leaves open the possibility that courts could apply this test in
completely different ways. Finally, the court looked to the dictionary.75 It
concluded that “significant” means “important” or “notable” and courts
should therefore consider whether the local defendants’ conduct was an
important ground of the claim when compared to the other defendants’
conduct.76 The Fifth Circuit has explicitly relied on the Kaufman court’s
statutory interpretation analysis.77
Like the Kaufman court, the Sixth Circuit has also relied on common
tools of statutory interpretation to justify the substantive distinction
approach.78 In Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C., the Sixth
Circuit noted that the Senate Report stated the purpose of the local
controversy exception: to ensure that “a truly local controversy – a
controversy that uniquely affects a particular locality to the exclusion of
all others’ – remains in state court.”79 According to the Mason court, the
Senate Report’s stated purpose justified the substantive distinction
approach, as it suggested that a controversy is not “truly local” unless the
local defendant’s conduct is substantively distinct.80 Like the Kaufman
court, the Sixth Circuit also compared the local defendant’s conduct to the
other defendants’ conduct to determine if it formed an “important” part of

70

Id. (citing Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).
Id. at 155–56.
72
Id. at 156.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 157.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Solutions, Inc. 655 F.3d 358, 361 (5th
Cir. 2011).
78
Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 397 (6th Cir.
2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 109-14, 39 (2005)).
79
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 109-14, 39 (2005)).
80
Id. at 388 (citing S. Rep. No. 109-14, 39 (2005)).
71
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the claim.81 Overall, courts using the substantive distinction approach
typically rely on tools of statutory interpretation and the CAFA Senate
Report as support for why the substantive distinction approach reaches the
appropriate jurisdictional result.82

2. Same Conduct Approach
While the substantive distinction approach requires a local
defendant’s conduct to be distinct from the other defendants, equivalent
conduct suffices in the same conduct approach. The same conduct
approach compares the local defendant’s conduct to the other defendants’
conduct, determining that the local defendant’s conduct forms a significant
basis of the claim if it is the same as or equivalent to the other defendants’
conduct.83
Courts’ support for the same conduct approach – like the substantive
distinction approach – comes from the plain text of the statute and
congressional intent, as well as from precedent.84 For instance, in Allen v.
Boeing Co., the Ninth Circuit looked to precedent and the plain text of the
local controversy exception to interpret “significant basis.”85 The Allen
court determined that claims about a local defendant’s conduct that are
“important or fairly large in amount or quantity” relative to the other
defendants’ conduct constitute a significant basis.86 In Allen, the plaintiffs
alleged the same complaint against both defendants, and the court
concluded that alleging the same important conduct – even with no
substantive distinction – satisfies the “significant basis” prong.87 The
court stated that it did not “read the statute, [its] decisions, or the decisions
of [its] sister circuits as requiring anything more” than alleging the same
conduct.88
In Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, the Ninth Circuit similarly began
its analysis of the local controversy exception by looking at the plain text
of the statute.89 The court noted that the use of the words “sought” and
“alleged” in the “significant defendant” provision indicated that the court
81
82

Id. at 396.
See Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir.

2009).
City of O’Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc. 930 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1046, 1051 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2013).
84
Coleman v. Estes Exp. Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2011);
Allen v. Boeing Co., 821 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2015); City of O’Fallon, 930
F.Supp.2d at 1045.
85
Allen, 821 F.3d at 1121.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Coleman, 631 F.3d at 1015.
83

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/16

10

Smith: Waste-d Chance: The Risk of Ignoring Judicial Federalism in Local

2022]

WASTE-D CHANCE: IGNORING JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

919

should look to the complaint.90 Here, the court expanded on the plain text
argument by looking to congressional intent, or, in this instance, the lack
of congressional intent to turn the local controversy exception into a trial
on the merits of the case.91 Complaints often allege the same conduct for
multiple defendants, and thus the Ninth Circuit believed that requiring
anything more than equivalent conduct would create mini-trials of the
case.92 Thus, the court was satisfied that significant conduct from both the
local defendant and out-of-state defendant was sufficient to establish a
“significant basis” and avoid further litigation on the differences in
significance.93 The Ninth Circuit has relied on tools of statutory
interpretation, precedent, and congressional intent in determining that the
local controversy exception demands the local defendant’s conduct be at
least the same as other defendants’ conduct to constitute a significant
basis.94
District courts using the same conduct approach have also looked to
congressional intent in determining where jurisdiction is appropriate.95 In
City of O’Fallon v. CenturyLink, the court noted that the purpose of the
local controversy exception is to keep controversies that are at their core
local in state courts, which have “a strong interest in resolving the
dispute.”96 The court determined that when all of the defendants’ conduct
is the same – as the plaintiff alleged in its complaint – “whether or not one
defendant’s conduct is ‘worse’” is irrelevant.97 The court cited to preWesterfeld Eighth Circuit precedent and Ninth Circuit precedent, noting
that when the local defendant’s conduct mirrors the other defendant’s
conduct, it constitutes a significant basis.98 The court ultimately held that
the local defendant’s conduct constituted a significant basis, justifying the
decision by acknowledging that Missouri has “a strong interest in
protecting its municipalities’ tax interests,” and state courts “[are] quite

90

Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1016–17.
92
Id. at 1017.
93
Id.
94
Allen v. Boeing Co., 821 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2016); Coleman, 631 F.3d
at 1017.
95
City of O’Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc., 930 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1045 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2013).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1047. Other district courts have used a similar analysis. See Moore v.
IOD Inc., 2016 WL 8941200 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016) (concluding that
Congress would have used the word “predominant” rather than “significant” if
Congress had intended a higher standard of conduct for a defendant to be considered
a “significant defendant”).
98
City of O’Fallon, 930 F.Supp.2d at 1048–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (citing
Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir. 2010) and Coleman
v. Estes Express Lines, 631 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011)).
91
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capable of adjudicating this dispute.”99 Ultimately, courts adopting the
same conduct approach rely on precedent, tools of statutory interpretation,
and congressional intent in determining that a local defendant’s conduct
may be the same as the other defendants’ conduct and still form a
“significant basis.”100 Because courts that adopt the substantive distinction
approach often rely on these same interpretative techniques, the
determination seemingly comes down to how courts view the competing
state and federal interests.

B. CERCLA, Potentially Responsible Parties, and “Significant Basis”
The Kitchin court also addressed a novel argument about the local
Defendant’s status as a Potentially Responsible Party under CERCLA as
a possible way to claim the local Defendant’s conduct formed a significant
basis.101 In environmental superfund cleanup cases under CERCLA such
as Kitchin, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) investigates
and designates potentially liable parties as “Potentially Responsible
Parties (PRPs).”102 If sued, PRPs are liable for the cost of recovery and
cleanup under CERCLA.103 The four categories of PRPs are: (1) current
owners or operators of the site, (2) past owners or operators, (3)
“generators,” or parties who either have hazardous substances disposed of
or treated at the site or facility, and (4) “transporters”—i.e., parties who
transported hazardous substances to the site.104 Before Kitchin, no courts
had ever examined whether a defendant was considered a PRP under
CERCLA as part of the significant basis analysis.105

City of O’Fallon, 930 F.Supp.2d at 1051.
See Allen v. Boeing Co., 821 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2016); Coleman v.
Estes Exp. Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011); City of O’Fallon, 930
F.Supp.2d at 1045.
101
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1097 (8th Cir. 2021).
102
Finding Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
enforcement/finding-potentially-responsible-parties-prp
[https://perma.cc/2BA7BBKN] (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
103
Carrier Corp. v. Piper, 460 F.Supp.2d 827, 834 (W.D. Tenn. 2006). Many
issues among PRPs are heavily litigated. The Environmental Protection Agency can
recover the cost from one PRP, who will then (likely) seek contribution from other
PRPs. Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the
Controversy over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 84 (1997). However, sometimes the sued PRP can only
recover proportionate shares of liability from other PRPs rather than fully shifting
liability. Id. at 85. As CERCLA has little legislative history, courts have struggled
with how to decide liability. Id. at 83.
104
Hernandez, supra note 103, at 90.
105
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1097 (8th Cir. 2021).
99

100
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C. Policy Considerations
The “significant basis” interpretation question, on its face, seems to
be strictly a question of statutory interpretation and Congressional intent.
However, courts use the same tools of statutory interpretation and the same
Senate Report to justify adopting the substantive distinction comparative
approach and the same conduct comparative approach, suggesting that the
argument ultimately boils down to a policy question about which court
– state or federal – is more appropriate to hear the class action lawsuit,
rather than strictly whether the local defendant’s conduct forms a
“significant basis.”106 Using the same tools of statutory interpretation to
justify different results is a common occurrence in law, with even the
majority and dissent in the same opinion turning a statutory interpretation
tool on its head to justify the result that the judge believes is legally
correct.107 As Karl Llewellyn famously noted, “there are two opposing
canons on almost every point.”108 Here, tools of statutory interpretation
and congressional intent are both being used to argue that either federal or
state jurisdiction is more appropriate.
There are many arguments – some proven and some imaginary – in
favor of retaining federal jurisdiction or in favor of state court
jurisdiction.109 Arguments favoring federal jurisdiction include a
“perception about state court judicial reluctance to grant summary
judgment.”110 This perception is partially based on three different
considerations: (1) federal judges hear all matters related to the case,
whereas state courts do not typically use a single assignment system;
(2) the existence of more summary judgment motions per day in state
courts; and (3) the view that federal courts are more likely to grant
dispositive motions—i.e., summary judgment motions.111 Other reasons
to prefer federal jurisdiction include unanimous jury requirements, more
standardized court rules, and expert evidence rules.112 When enacting
CAFA, the Senate determined that federal courts should retain jurisdiction
for class action lawsuits because “state court judges are less careful than
their federal court counterparts” and federal judges “pay closer attention
106
Thomas Mayhew, Choosing Federal or State Court in Consumer Class
Actions, 16 ASS’N OF BUS. TRIAL LAWS. REP. 3 (2007), https://www.fbm.com/content/
uploads/2019/01/d4432a59-fa9f-4c3e-9c87-17abe373749c_document.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8F36-WPPT].
107
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 3, 401
(1950).
108
Id.
109
See Rice, supra note 42, at 459, 459–67.
110
Mayhew, supra note 106.
111
Id.
112
Id.; Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 603.
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to the procedural requirements for certifying a . . . class.”113 Finally, class
action reformers argue that federal courts should have jurisdiction over
class actions because class actions typically implicate complex, nationalinterest legal issues.114
Arguments in favor of state jurisdiction include the idea that state
judges are more willing than federal judges to certify classes, and thus
plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer state courts.115 Plaintiffs’ attorneys tend to
choose state court when a high percentage of class members reside in the
state where the case is filed.116 Proponents of state jurisdiction in class
actions also argue that state judges have “authority, competence,
judiciousness, and efficiency to hear and decide class actions.”117 Further,
many parties prefer state courts because of the lower legal expenses and
fewer unexpected costs.118 Supporters of state jurisdiction claim that
allowing out-of-state corporate defendants to remove state law cases to
federal courts departs from the idea of judicial federalism.119 Finally, state
jurisdiction proponents argue that federal courts are biased toward the kind
of defendants likely to be out-of-state defendants in class-actions – like
corporations – even more so than state courts are biased toward in-state
plaintiffs.120 Thus, they argue, it does not make sense to move state law
class actions and other class actions to federal courts because of a
purported bias issue.121
The federal versus state court jurisdiction debate is, essentially, a
debate over judicial federalism. Judicial federalism describes the federal
and state court separation of judicial authority.122 In class-action lawsuits
where both state and federal courts could exercise jurisdiction, history has
shown that the balance between federal jurisdiction and federal deference
to state jurisdiction has swung consistently with changes of statutory
interpretation.123 In Kitchin, the court ultimately favored retaining federal
jurisdiction, using the “significant basis” element as an alternative to
addressing judicial federalism.124
113

Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 593; S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14
(2005). Some believe these assumptions are based on “untested anecdotes,” as there
is no evidence to support them. Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 594.
114
Rice, supra note 42, at 425.
115
Willging & Wheatman, supra note 40, at 593.
116
Id. at 612.
117
Rice, supra note 42, at 431.
118
See id. at 443.
119
Id. at 427.
120
Id. at 444.
121
Id.
122
Donald P. Haider-Markel, Judicial Federalism, POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF U.S. STATES AND REGIONS, 819.
123
Id. at 820.
124
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2021).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/16

14

Smith: Waste-d Chance: The Risk of Ignoring Judicial Federalism in Local

2022]

WASTE-D CHANCE: IGNORING JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

923

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Kitchin, the Eighth Circuit held that the complaint did not allege
that the local defendant’s conduct constituted a “significant basis” under
the local controversy exception and thus declined to remand the decision
to state court.125 The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims mainly
focused on how Defendants jointly “managed and operated the landfill.”126
The court noted that the complaint did not show that the local Defendant’s
conduct was an important ground compared to all other defendants’
actions.127 The court pointed to the district court’s finding that Defendants
“all engaged in the same conduct that caused Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries,”
which does not suffice to serve as a significant basis under the substantive
distinction approach.128 The district court, however, concluded that this
allegation did suffice to show the local defendant’s conduct formed a
significant basis, seemingly following the same conduct approach.129 The
court also noted that Plaintiffs listed only one paragraph about the local
Defendant’s conduct in the 199-paragraph complaint.130
The court determined that the complaint did not distinguish the local
Defendant’s conduct from the nonlocal Defendants’ conduct.131 Rather,
the court stated that Plaintiffs used a “cut-and-paste approach” when
describing Defendants’ conduct in the complaint.132 The court also
concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations differed slightly because Plaintiffs
alleged more about the nonlocal Defendants than the local Defendant,
which the court determined is not a “substantive distinction,” endorsing
the substantive distinction approach in the Eighth Circuit.133 The court
finally concluded that merely pleading that the conduct “forms a
significant basis” is a legal conclusion and cannot alone satisfy the
significant-basis requirement.134
Although the court rejected an argument from Plaintiffs about
Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) status, as Plaintiffs did not allege it
in the complaint, the court continued to analyze the merits of the
argument.135 The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the local

125

Id. at 1096.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1094.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1095.
131
Id. at 1096.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985);
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); Atwood v. Peterson, 936 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 2019).
135
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1097.
126
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Defendant’s status as a PRP acts as extrinsic evidence to show that the
local Defendant’s conduct does form a significant basis.136 Rather, the
court noted that “even parties not responsible for contamination may fall
within the broad definitions of PRPs” under CERCLA.137 Further, the
court pointed out that Plaintiffs did not explain why the EPA categorized
the local Defendant as a PRP.138 Thus, the court concluded that the EPA’s
designation of the local Defendant as a PRP is not alone enough to
determine that its conduct forms a significant basis under the comparative
substantive distinction approach.139
In his concurrence, Judge Stras argued that there was a more
straightforward resolution to this case.140 Judge Stras noted that Rock
Road Industries, the only Missouri citizen and thus only local Defendant,
merged with an out-of-state entity and no longer existed as a separate
entity after the complaint was filed but before removal to federal court.141
Judge Stras argued that the court must evaluate citizenship at the time of
removal and noted that there was no longer a defendant “who is a citizen
of the State in which the action was originally filed” as required by the
local controversy exception.142

V. COMMENT
Before Kitchin, various circuits had formulated different approaches
to determine what constitutes a “significant basis.”143 The Kitchin court
clearly defined the split and listed the precedential breakdown of the tests,
clarifying the current “significant basis” jurisprudence.144
In Kitchin, the court held that the local defendant’s conduct did not
form a significant basis when the complaint alleged that the local
defendant and the out-of-state defendants engaged in the same conduct.145
This case not only explained and summarized the different “significant
basis” interpretations,146 but it definitively favored the substantive
distinction sect of the comparative approach.147 However, it did so
136

Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007)).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1097–98.
140
Id. at 1098 (Stras, J., concurring).
141
Id.
142
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc) (emphasis added)).
143
See Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009);
see Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019); see Coleman v.
Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011).
144
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1095.
145
Id. at 1096–97.
146
Id. at 1094.
147
Id. at 1095.
137
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seemingly without considering the underlying purpose of the local
controversy exception’s requirement of removal to state court. The court
instead relied on other courts’ decisions that used statutory interpretation
and looked to congressional intent to justify the substantive distinction
approach.148 The court asserted that the same conduct approach has not
been the approach taken in the Eighth Circuit since Westerfeld,149 but it
failed to explain its rationale for strongly favoring the substantive
distinction approach. Further, it argued that federal courts have a duty to
retain jurisdiction over class actions, but it failed to acknowledge the
purpose of the local controversy exception or the possibility that state
courts have an interest in hearing local controversies.150

A. The Kitchin Court’s Oversight
The Kitchin court should have considered the state interest that gave
rise to the local controversy exception and, at the very least, clarified its
rationale. The lack of clarity in rationale perpetuates an unclear
standard.151 As a result, the same conduct and substantive distinction
dueling systems will continue to be in conflict over the desire to retain
jurisdictional power.152 The court turned the “significant basis” element
into a proxy for determining which court is more appropriate to hear the
case, preying on the exception’s ambiguity.
The Kitchin court dodged the policy question of judicial federalism,
opting instead to use tools of statutory interpretation and legislative
purpose to justify its ultimate decision that conduct needs to be
substantively distinct to constitute a significant basis. While using tools
of statutory interpretation can be helpful, the court’s failure to consider

148

Id. at 1093–94 (relying on a Third Circuit case using statutory interpretation
and congressional intent to adopt the substantive distinction approach).
149
Id. at 1094–95. See Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819 (8th
Cir. 2010).
150
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1093.
151
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 3, 399
(1950).
151
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1095.
152
See e.g., Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir.
2009); see e.g., Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019);
Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011). The
differing outcomes in these three cases, discussed supra, Part III.A.1–2, demonstrates
the conflict that still continues to this day.
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anything else – i.e., public policy – created an unfair precedent for class
action plaintiffs.153
The Kitchin court ultimately doubted the significance of the local
defendant’s conduct.154 Still, it is essential to unpack the potential biases
and assumptions underlying the court’s holding that the local defendant’s
conduct was not significant enough because it engaged in merely the same
conduct as out-of-state defendants.155 As the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals sets precedent for all district courts in the Eighth Circuit, it is
likely that more class-actions with potentially local controversies will be
litigated in federal courts after this decision. Thus, it is important to
understand the court’s logic and rationale, as the meaning of “significant
basis” will affect future Eighth Circuit cases.

B. What Courts Should Consider in a Significant Basis Analysis
What “significant basis” analysis would have been appropriate for
the Kitchin court? Using the comparative approach to determine what
conduct forms a “significant basis” is a clearer standard than the approach
used in Evans and the loose tests used by other district courts. Courts have
generally agreed, adopting the less ambiguous comparative approach over
Evans.156 However, determining which method within the comparative
approach is a clearer test to apply and more in line with congressional
intention is a more challenging endeavor.157 This is because courts apply
the same rules of statutory interpretation to the local controversy exception
and still come to different conclusions about which approach is
appropriate.158
Another factor that influences a court’s comparative approach
analysis is concern about straw man defendants.159 To combat straw men,
courts that have adopted the substantive distinction approach argue that
requiring a complaint to allege that a local defendant’s conduct was
substantively distinct from the out-of-state defendant’s conduct will
153

Robert E. Keeton, Statutory Analogy, Purpose, and Policy in Legal
Reasoning Live Lobsters and A Tiger Cub in the Park, 52 MD. L. REV. 1192, 1206
(1993).
154
Id. at 1095.
155
Id. at 1096–97.
156
See Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2009); see
Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 362–63 (5th Cir.
2011); see Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 396 (6th
Cir. 2016); Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 584 (7th Cir. 2017); see
Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1096; Coleman v. Estes Exp. Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2011); see Woods v. Standard Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 1257, 1267 n.6 (10th Cir. 2014).
157
See supra Part III.A.
158
See supra Part III.A.
159
See supra Part III.
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ensure that the local defendant was more than a straw man.160 However,
this heightened standard runs the risk of keeping truly local controversies
out of state courts where they belong according to the local controversy
exception that Congress created.161
When analyzing congressional intent, courts also consider that,
broadly, Congress enacted CAFA to retain federal jurisdiction over class
actions, which Congress viewed as complex, national-interest lawsuits.162
But many courts overlook the importance of Congress explicitly carving
out an exception to ensure that state courts adjudicate truly local
controversies, as state courts have a greater interest in state
controversies.163 The local controversy exception exists for a reason and
is mandatory for federal courts to follow for a reason: Congress wanted to
retain state jurisdiction over state controversies.164
Looking at the plain text of the statute, it is unclear that the
substantive distinction approach correctly interprets “significant” to mean
distinct from others’ conduct.165 If Congress intended the behavior to be
compared and for conduct to be distinctively pled, it could have written
the law that way.166 The Kitchin court asserted that “significant” plainly
means “important,” but it jumps to the conclusion that “important” cannot
mean “same.”167 The language of CAFA does not state that “significant”
does not mean “same,” and there is no reason to infer that the conduct
being the “same” means it is not necessarily “significant.”168 If a local
defendant is engaged in the same conduct as the out-of-state defendant –
conduct that is deemed important enough for the out-of-state defendant to
be a part of the lawsuit – it is confounding that this same conduct is not
“significant” enough to justify the state adjudicating a case that it has a
clear interest to hear.
Further, it is not clear that requiring a plaintiff to allege that the local
defendant’s conduct was substantively distinct from the other out-of-state
defendants’ conduct will defeat the straw man problem—if it even

160

15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43.
Id.
162
Rice, supra note 42, at 425.
163
City of O'Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1045 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2013).
164
15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43.
165
See Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009).
166
Moore v. IOD Inc., No. 14-CV-8406 (VSB), at *6, 2016 WL 8941200
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016). For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires conduct by a
person acting through an enterprise to be distinctively pled. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c);
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass’n, 14 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616 (D.N.J.
2014).
167
Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1094 (8th Cir. 2021).
168
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
161
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exists.169 Even with the same conduct approach, the local defendant is not
really a “straw man” defendant, as it is a defendant who has engaged in at
least the same level of conduct as the other defendants in the suit.170 The
strategic inclusion of a local defendant who engaged in the same level of
conduct as other defendants certainly does not raise the same concerns as
a typical “straw man” problem. And courts that believe the substantive
distinction approach will cure the straw man problem have forgotten that
where there is a will, there is a way. A plaintiff who wants to join a local
straw man defendant in the lawsuit will know that all she needs to do is
make the allegations about the local defendant’s conduct substantively
distinct to keep the lawsuit in state court.171 The heightened requirement
of substantive distinction within the comparative approach seems like an
arbitrary test that courts use to feign compliance with congressional intent
and keep complex legal cases out of state courts without analyzing whether
federal court is the appropriate place for the case to be heard.172

C. Facing the Federal Court Bias and Its Consequences
As courts have turned these same statutory interpretation and
legislative purpose justifications on their heads to support different
standards, the debate over retaining federal court jurisdiction or removing
to state court truly boils down to underlying biases about the dual court
system. The choice between federal and state jurisdiction is not a novel
one, and in this case, it manifests as a debate over statutory interpretation
and legislative purpose.173 Unsurprisingly, when it comes to the local
controversy exception, federal courts, especially at the appellate level, are
in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction. 174

169

Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 2015)
(Wallace, J. dissenting).
170
City of O’Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc. 930 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1046, 1051 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2013).
171
Id. If the court finds that the local Defendant was arbitrarily thrown in to gain
state-court jurisdiction, the attorney could face sanctions (e.g., Rule 11 sanctions). See
F.R.C.P. R.11; STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 10
ed., 409 (2019).
172
See Benko, 789 F.3d at 1122; See generally Moore v. IOD Inc., No. 14-CV8406 (VSB), 2016 WL 8941200 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016).
173
Rice, supra note 42, at 427.
174
See Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1096 (2021)
(concluding that the local Defendant’s conduct did not constitute a significant basis
and determining that federal jurisdiction is proper). Notably, in City of O’Fallon v.
CenturyLink, Inc., a district court concluded that state jurisdiction is appropriate and
noted that Missouri had a strong interest in hearing the case because the local
Defendant’s conduct did constitute a significant basis. 930 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1051
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
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The judicial federalism debate is one that will not likely be settled
over what constitutes a “significant basis” under the local controversy
exception. This is especially true when looking at how the Kitchin court,
like others, avoided the judicial federalism policy justification in favor of
a more seemingly neutral statutory interpretation justification.175 Still, this
uncertainty has serious, detrimental effects on class action lawsuits. The
danger of not having a clear, universal standard for what constitutes a
significant basis will lead to continued forum shopping in class actions,
ultimately meaning courts will enforce laws inequitably.176 Forum
shopping can cause a lack of efficiency, as well as unfairness.177
This kind of vertical forum shopping – choosing between federal and
state court – is made easier because of the jurisprudential vagueness of the
local controversy exception’s “significant basis” prong.178 Class actions
exist, in part, to provide strength in numbers and allow individuals who
might not otherwise have the opportunity to pursue litigation to have their
day in court.179 And, plaintiffs prefer state court over federal court for its
convenience and cost-effectiveness, in addition to the fact that plaintiffs
have local connections.180 For example, plaintiffs looking for a costeffective forum were four times more likely to file the class action in state
court than to file in federal court.181 And plaintiffs who wanted higher jury
awards were over three times more likely to file the class action in state
court than in federal court.182 Finally, plaintiffs who sought convenience
were over two times more likely to file a class action in state court than in
federal court.183 By making remand to federal court easier, the Kitchin
court’s interpretation of the local controversy exception will make it more
difficult for plaintiffs and their lawyers to achieve their desired goals of

175

See Kitchin 3 F.4th at 1089; see Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co.,
561 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
176
Markus Petsche, What's Wrong with Forum Shopping - An Attempt to Identify
and Assess the Real Issues of a Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L LAW. 1005, 1010
(2011).
177
Id.
178
Cf. Shrey Sharma, Do the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards on Class
Certification Incentivize Forum Shopping?: A Comparative Analysis of the Second
Circuit’s Class Certification Jurisprudence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 881 (2016).
179
MARGARET M ZWISLER, ET AL., OVERVIEW OF CLASS/COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
AND CURRENT TRENDS 1 (Mar. 31, 2022), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/
TheClassActionsGuide-US [https://perma.cc/73P6-JHFH].
180
THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEY’S CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 19
(2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/clact05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ER8V-SXCG].
181
Id. at 71.
182
Id. at 72.
183
Id. at 73.
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class action litigation. It is true that defendants have just as many reasons
to remove a case to federal court—and thus, the policy question often
becomes a balance of respective party interests. But, in a system set up in
many ways to favor the interests of wealthy defendants, the local
controversy exception seemed to give some of the power back to
individual plaintiffs.184 The Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the substantive
distinction approach hinders class-action plaintiffs’ ability to have their
controversy heard in the appropriate forum. This is the type of unfairness
the local controversy exception sought to prevent.
In a system committed to promoting justice and fairness, this concern
should sound the alarm and make courts re-think which standard they
adopt. And, even better, the Supreme Court or Congress should enact a
uniform definition and approach to the “significant basis” question which
respects the purpose of the local controversy exception.

VI. CONCLUSION
The plain language of CAFA makes it clear that local controversy
class actions are more appropriate for state court, as evidenced by
Congress’s explicit inclusion of the exception in CAFA. Yet in Kitchin, it
was a federal court that chose to retain federal jurisdiction in reliance on
the substantive distinction approach to determining what conduct
constitutes a “significant basis.”185 After the court’s analysis in Kitchin,
other circuits that have yet to determinatively adopt a test may adopt the
substantive distinction approach. The Kitchin court beefed up the
precedential weight of the test and added further arguments in its favor.
However, the Kitchin court failed to adequately explore other approaches
to defining “significant” and examine the consequences of all approaches
on the future of class action lawsuits.186 This will place a real financial
and temporal burden on future class action plaintiffs in the Eighth
Circuit.187 The same conduct approach comports more with congressional
intent behind the local controversy exception and also gives state courts
the power to adjudicate controversies that the state has an interest in—
conflicts involving local plaintiffs and a local defendant.188
The substantive distinction approach diverts from congressional
intent and the plain language of CAFA as compared to the same conduct

184

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)–(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I); Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 3 F.4th
1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1111 (2022).
186
See Kitchin, 3 F.4th at 1094.
187
THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, supra note 180.
188
15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43; City of O'Fallon v. CenturyLink, Inc.,
930 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1045 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Stevens v. Diversicare
Leasing Corp., No. 09-6008, 2009 WL 1212488, at *5 (W.D. Ark. May 4, 2009).
185
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approach, but a universal standard is better than no clear standard at all
when it comes to the possibility of forum-shopping. The best solution is
to adopt a universal standard to inform plaintiffs and defendants of where
class-action lawsuits appropriately belong and to ensure that justice may
be equitably served. Ideally, the same conduct approach would be the
universally adopted standard.
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